[Box Backup] Danger of files being erased
Alaric B Snell
boxbackup@fluffy.co.uk
Mon, 02 Feb 2004 10:17:41 +0000
Ben Summers wrote:
> The current security model assumes that access to the client machine and
> it's data is equivalent to access to the backups -- which I feel is
> reasonable since an attacker can just read the unencrypted files.
> However, future versions will have a system of "marking" snapshots, so
> you'll easily be able to go back in time before the compromise.
>
> There's roughly the same problem with any other backup system -- if you
> don't notice and rotate so the good data is deleted, you've lost the
> backup.
Yep. You can only undo changes within a finite timeframe, and the length
of that timeframe (in the case of incremental backups) may depend on the
rate of change of data, meaning an attacker may even deliberately
shorten it by having his rootkit create and frequently update a 1GB file
somewhere :-)
I presume the bbstored protocol doesn't allow any other way of getting
rid of a backed up file than uploading changes to that file as fast as
you can until the good version is expired, right? If so, then all you
need is a reasonable upload bandwidth limitation and an easy way of
getting old versions by date and/or getting "diffs" of the live system
to see what's changed, and it could be a valuable un-rootkitting tool too!
>
> Interesting... :-)
>
Let's discuss this tomorrow!
>
> Ben
>
ABS